Western media coverage of female genital modifications in Africa has been hyperbolic and one-sided, presenting them uniformly as mutilation and ignoring the cultural complexities that underlie these practices. Even if we ultimately decide that female genital modifications should be abandoned, the debate around them should be grounded in a better account of the facts.

After offering a characterization of what unites versions of ‘expressivism’, we highlight a number of dimensions along which expressivist views should be distinguished. We then separate four theses often associated with expressivism – a positive expressivist thesis, a positive constitutivist thesis, a negative ontological thesis, and a negative semantic thesis – and describe how traditional expressivists have attempted to incorporate them. We argue that expressivism in its traditional form may be fatally flawed, but that expressivists nonetheless have the resources for (...) preserving what is essential to their view. These resources comprise a re-configuring of expressivism, the result of which is the view we call ‘neo-expressivism’. After illustrating how the neo-expressivist model works in the case of avowals and ethical claims, we explain how it avoids the problems of traditional expressivism. (shrink)

In facing up to life and its challenges, questions inevitably arise. Different situations provoke specific questions mostly trivial but frequently fundamental always seeking some kind of answer. While the transition from question to quest is a rather natural one for human beings and the need for answers is a serious human demand, the quest itself is significant, precisely because it is a human task. This book offers a number of literary-philosophical enquiries into these challenges of life. But it is the (...) one set of quests stimulated, deepened and widened by literature and philosophy as well as developed in a literary and philosophical way. Among the topics covered are: the search for meaning in life, the quest for wisdom, the aim of moral striving, the need for community life, the importance of relationships, the challenge of suffering, the desire for deliverance, and the longing for immortality. (shrink)

Notably absent from much of the psychological literature on emotion regulation are attempts to answer explicitly normative questions about the phenomenon. It is one thing to explain how emotional states are regulated. It is another thing to say something about what reasons there are to regulate our emotions, whether and why we might sometimes be obligated to regulate our emotions, and how we regulate our emotions well, or optimally. This paper is an attempt at the latter task, focused specifically on (...) a type of emotion regulation also receiving little attention in the literature—what I call dispositional emotion regulation. Dispositional regulation occurs, when it does, at some point or period of time significantly prior to the onset of affected emotional states or episodes, and by means of modifying the subject’s emotional dispositions. And it is done well, or optimally, I argue, when it is done with an aim toward achieving and maintaining a coherent and comprehensible self, in the sense Shaftesbury had in mind. (shrink)

This paper criticises the ideological dimension of the AI narrative. It does so by questioning the implicit assumptions behind its vision, which promises a world that automatically adapts to our desires before we even know them. These assumptions hinge on a misconception of the value of desire as residing exclusively with its fulfilment, warranting human manipulation for increased predictability. This social trajectory towards algorithmic governance, rather than delivering on the promised fulfilment, undermines our capacity to sustain the same desire that (...) it uses to justify its enterprise. (shrink)

IntroductionEthical intuitionists have never known quite what to make of the emotions. Generally speaking, these philosophers fall into two camps: rational intuitionists and moral sense theorists. And by my lights, neither camp has been able to tell a convincing story about the exact role and significance of emotion in moral judgment. Rational intuitionists are for the most part too dismissive of the emotions, either regarding emotions as little more than distractions to moral judgment,Samuel Clarke, for instance, after naming our “faculties (...) of reason and will, whereby [we] are enabled to distinguish good from evil,” laments that these faculties are sometimes “imposed upon and deceived in matters of good and evil, right and wrong… by absurd passions and corrupt or partial affections” (A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation (Glasgow: Richard Griffin and Co., 1823), pp. 166-167). (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify the relation between moral virtue and the emotions, but with an ulterior motive: I want an account of this relation that is not only plausible on its own, but also, one that helps to explain when, and how, our emotions might contribute to the justification of moral beliefs formed on their basis.

Creative synthesis, an interpretation of causality developed by Charles Hartshorne in his philosophical works, attempts to provide a way out of the determinism-indeterminism debate in philosophical discussions. At the same time, it is grounded in contemporary physics which regards effects as statistical averages rather than fully predictable results of the action of causes. This paper will seek to contextualise this interpretation of causality within the metaphysics of Charles Hartshorne, establish its basis and develop its implications. The resulting philosophy of action, (...) grounded in the principle of dipolarity that provides a new insight into the cause-and-effect relationship, attempts to address the issues of activity/ receptivity, novelty/givenness, and freedom/restriction not only in the human sphere but also in the whole of reality. (shrink)

Ethics has become a particularly relevant topic for discussion and a subject for serious study. It has a very long tradition, of course; but nowadays one hears frequently of the need, because of abuses or concerns, to formulate and adopt ethical codes in various areas or professions. This book aims to make a philosophical contribution to the discussions and debates on the topic. Compared to the traditional approach to the philosophical study of ethics, however, this book adopts a different strategy. (...) It shows that such ethical thinking, in the concrete particulars, originates in various academic and professional contexts, among others. But inasmuch as theoretical issues require wider and more intensive attention, it argues that ethical thinking needs to be pursued further and that it can be aided by philosophical investigations. In its concluding chapters the book presents an alternative foundation for ethical decision-making. Philosophically grounded, it moves away from an individualistic ethical perspective to a relational one that has been shaped through dialogue with the various contexts in which ethical think-ing arises. (shrink)

Ethical Expressivism Broadly speaking, the term “expressivism” refers to a family of views in the philosophy of language according to which the meanings of claims in a particular area of discourse are to be understood in terms of whatever non-cognitive mental states those claims are supposed to express. More specifically, an expressivist theory of claims […].

One of the controversial issQes which have recently come into prominence among philosophers and theologians is how one should understand the term l God. It seems that, despite the fact that a certain idea of God is assumed by not most, people, there is a degree of disagreement over the meaning many, if of the term. "God" is generally taken to refer to a supreme Being, the Creator, who is perfect and self-existent, holy, personal and loving. This understanding of "God" (...) corresponds to what many have either been brought up to believe in or have come to accept as the meaning of this word. Neverthe less, theists appear to be defending a particular idea of God and to be accusing atheists of attacking another, one which does not tie in with the theistic interpretation. Cardinal Maximos IV, for instance, is quoted as saying, "The God the atheists don't believe in is a God I don't believe in either. "2 On the other hand, atheists have been challenging believers to explain clearly what they mean by "God" because these critics cannot see how that idea can have any acceptable meaning. Furthermore, theists them selves seem to be divided over the issue. H. P. Owen in his book Concepts of Deity shows quite convincingly that there is "a bewildering variety of concepts of God" among theists. ' One has only to ask around for confirma tion of this observation. (shrink)

Developments in technology and communications haveenhanced the status and role of imaging. They haveresulted not just in the excellent quality of images but alsoin the speed and ease of distributing or communicatingthem. But with the welcome advances have also comeundesirable and even threatening consequences for bothindividuals and society. These have presented challengesand issues which need to be addressed urgently. Focusingfirst on the tension between image and reality, it providesa philosophical background to the debate. It thendiscusses the question of truth and (...) the related issues ofthe right to know, freedom of speech and privacy. Itprovides the foundation for these fundamental rights butalso examines the tensions or conflicts in their exercise. Italso discusses some guidelines to deal with thesechallenges and issues; namely, the criteria ofappropriateness and acceptability and the importance ofaccountability. It suggests that in addition, given thefrailty of human nature and the lessons of history, societyalso needs the support of laws and policies. (shrink)

My aim is to challenge recent attempts at reconciling moral realism and naturalism by pushing ethical naturalists into a dilemma. According to one horn of the dilemma, ethical naturalists must either build unique facts and properties about divergent social structures into their subvenient sets of natural facts and properties, and so jeopardize the objectivity of moral truths, or insist, in the face of all possible worlds in which people have different moral beliefs than ours, that they are all mistaken—this despite (...) the fact that the belief-forming mechanism responsible for their moral beliefs was never concerned with the truth of those beliefs in the first place. This will bring me to suggest that moral properties might only weakly supervene upon natural phenomena. But, according to the other horn of the dilemma, weak supervenience is a defeater for moral knowledge. (shrink)

The essays in this collection, which examine the philosophies of Charles Hartshorne and A.N. Whitehead, represent the author's journey over the years to achieve a greater understanding of certain aspects of the Christian religion by making use of their metaphysical systems. Among the topics discussed are: reason and faith, concepts of God, the problem of evil, the doctrine of immortality, religion and science, religion in life, and philosophy and literature. Also included in this volume is the primary bibliography of Hartshorne's (...) philosophical works. (shrink)

According to a standard interpretation of Hannah Arendt’s remarks about evil, she had a psychologically thin conception of evil action. This paper has two aims. First, I argue that the distinction between psychological thinness and thickness is poorly conceived, at least as it commonly applies to theories of evil action. And second, I argue that, according to a better conception of the thin-thick distinction, Arendt is being misinterpreted.

After offering a characterization of what unites versions of ‘expressivism’, we highlight a number of dimensions along which expressivist views should be distinguished. We then separate four theses often associated with expressivism – a positive expressivist thesis, a positive constitutivist thesis, a negative ontological thesis, and a negative semantic thesis – and describe how traditional expressivists have attempted to incorporate them. We argue that expressivism in its traditional form may be fatally flawed, but that expressivists nonetheless have the resources for (...) preserving what is essential to their view. These resources comprise a re‐configuring of expressivism, the result of which is the view we call ‘neo‐expressivism’. After illustrating how the neo‐expressivist model works in the case of avowals and ethical claims, we explain how it avoids the problems of traditional expressivism. (shrink)

According to ethical neo-expressivism, all declarative sentences, including those used to make ethical claims, have propositions as their semantic contents, and acts of making an ethical claim are properly said to express mental states, which (if motivational internalism is correct) are intimately connected to motivation. This raises two important questions: (i) The traditional reason for denying that ethical sentences express propositions is that these were thought to determine ways the world could be, so unless we provide an analysis of ethical (...) terms in terms of natural properties, are we not committed to the Moorean conclusion that ethical sentences describe sui generis “nonnatural” ways the world could be? (ii) If we reject the claim that motivational attitudes constitute any part of the semantics of ethical sentences, are we not committed to denying the intuition behind motivational internalism after all? This chapter argues for negative answers to both of these questions. (shrink)

É bastante conhecida a interrogação do filósofo Immanuel Kant a respeito da possibilidade ou não de se ensinar filosofia. Partindo-se da premissa de que não é possível dissociar a filosofia de seu ensino, este artigo se propôs a responder a seguinte questão: de que maneira a Revista Digital de Ensino de Filosofia (ReFiLo) contribui para o debate e o fortalecimento da educação filosófica no Brasil? Para responder a esta pergunta, realizou-se uma pesquisa de natureza qualitativa e quantitativa, adotando-se a pesquisa (...) bibliométrica para caracterizar a produção científica publicada pela revista entre 2015 e 2021. Os resultados do estudo indicaram que a ReFiLo difundiu 116 publicações, as quais 76% referem-se a artigos de periódicos científicos. Os dados revelaram, ainda, que essas publicações foram produzidas por 155 filósofos e filósofas da educação com formações acadêmicas variadas, especialmente nas áreas de filosofia e educação. Os resultados mostraram, também, que a pesquisa bibliográfica e a documental foram as mais utilizadas na construção dos trabalhos publicados pela ReFiLo. As 116 publicações geraram um total de 217 palavras-chave, que representaram o conteúdo filosófico-educacional dos trabalhos comunicados. Por fim, os dados sinalizaram que as 116 publicações foram escritas, sustentando-se teórica e metodologicamente, em 1.011 obras. Esta pesquisa concluiu que a ReFiLo se caracteriza por ser um periódico filosófico-educacional aberto e democrático que recepciona, avalia e publica reflexões sobre a educação filosófica produzida por autores/as com diferentes capitais filosófico-educacionais acumulados e que promovem os movimentos de resistências para manter a filosofia viva nos currículos escolares. (shrink)